On August 7, 2025, a federal court in the District of Columbia issued an order to resolve a lawsuit originally filed by environmental groups in 2018 to challenge a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that same year which clarified that air emissions from animal waste were exempt from notification requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”). According to the environmental groups, EPA had misinterpreted the text of EPCRA which they claimed required concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”) to report emissions of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide above certain quantities. However, the court disagreed, finding that an appropriate reading of EPCRA, together with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) did not require CAFO operations to report air emissions of animal waste.
Background
Both CERCLA and EPCRA are intended to help communities address and respond to chemical emergencies. Each law includes public notification requirements that mandate when the release of a particular pollutant must be disclosed to the public. The court decision in Rural Empowerment Ass’n for Cmty. Help v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, No. 1:18-cv-02260 (D. D.C. Aug.7, 2025) focuses squarely on how the two statutes intersect.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CERCLA, also known as Superfund, was first established by Congress in 1980. The statute is administered by EPA and establishes a framework to investigate and clean up areas that have been contaminated with hazardous substances. As part of that framework, section 103 of CERCLA requires anyone in charge of a facility covered by the statute to “immediately notify” EPA of the “release” of any “hazardous substance” over a certain threshold. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). CERCLA goes on to define “release” as “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, or disposing” of hazardous substances “into the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22). EPA is required to maintain a list of hazardous substances which are subject to CERCLA requirements. That list can be found here.
Along with outlining the types of releases of hazardous substances that must be reported to EPA, Congress also established exemptions to CERCLA’s reporting requirements. The definition of “release” specifically excludes from reporting requirements those releases that result in exposure to “persons solely within a workplace” and engine exhaust emissions from certain vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22). Similarly, the release of a hazardous substance that is “a continuous release, stable in quantity and rate” is exempt from emergency reporting requirements so long as the release is reported annually and there is no significant increase from previous annual reports. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(f)(2).
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
EPCRA was enacted in 1986 in response to concerns about the environmental and safety hazards associated with storing and handling toxic waste. EPCRA ensures that EPA will work together with state and local governments and the private sector to control and respond to releases of “extremely hazardous substances” into the environment. Just as EPA maintains a list of “hazardous substances” under CERCLA, it also maintains a list of “extremely hazardous substances” under EPCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(2). That list can be found here.
Also similar to CERCLA, EPCRA contains emergency notification requirements. EPCRA outlines three instances when facilities that produce, use, or store certain chemical substances are required to make an emergency notification about the release of those substances into the environment. First, an emergency notification is required if there is a release of an “extremely hazardous substance” if the release would require notification under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1). Second, emergency notification is required if there is a release of an “extremely hazardous substance,” the release is not subject to CERCLA notification requirements, and the release is not federally permitted, the amount released exceeds the threshold for notification, and the release “occurs in a manner which would require notification” under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(2). Finally, EPCRA mandates emergency notification if there is a release of a substance that is not an “extremely hazardous substance,” but which would require a notification under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(3).
Current Lawsuit
In 2018, Congress passed the Fair Agricultural Reporting Method Act (“FARM Act”) which amended CERCLA to further exempt certain agricultural emissions from reporting requirements. Specifically, the FARM Act exempts the application of registered pesticide products and “air emissions from animal waste (including decomposing animal waste) at a farm” from CERCLA reporting requirements. Six months after the FARM Act passed, EPA proposed a regulation to exempt animal waste air emissions from EPCRA’s emergency notification requirements reasoning that because such releases no longer required notice under CERCLA, they also no longer met the emergency notification requirements of EPCRA. The rule was finalized in 2019.
The plaintiffs in Rural Empowerment Ass’n for Cmty. Help v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency sued EPA to challenge the 2019 rule exempting air emissions from animal waste from EPCRA reporting requirements. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that despite the FARM Act, air releases of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide from animal waste were still reportable under the EPCRA requirement to report releases of “extremely hazardous substances” that are not subject to CERCLA notification requirements provided the release occurs in a manner which would require notification under CERCLA. The plaintiffs argued that both ammonia and hydrogen sulfide are considered “extremely hazardous substances” for the purposes of CERCLA, and that although the FARM Act specifically exempted air emissions from animal waste from CERCLA notification requirements, it did not exempt such releases from EPCRA reporting requirements. According to the plaintiffs, the 2019 rule was invalid because EPCRA requires notification of the release of “extremely hazardous substances” even if there is no parallel notification requirement under CERCLA. For that reason, the plaintiffs asked the court to overturn the 2019 rule and order EPA to require EPCRA notification for air emissions of ammonia and hydrogen sulfate from animal waste.
Court Decision
The court’s August 7 decision in Rural Empowerment Ass’n for Cmty. Help v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency considered the intersection between CERCLA’s and EPCRA’s reporting requirements and whether EPA and violated EPCRA by passing the 2019 final rule. Specifically, the court focused on the EPCRA requirement that facilities which produce, use, or store certain chemical substances must make a public notification of the release of EPCRA-classified “extremely hazardous substances” even if the release is not subject to CERCLA reporting requirements so long as the release “occurs in a manner which would require notification under section 103(a) of CERCLA.” Because there was no dispute that ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, the two pollutants that the plaintiffs identified in their lawsuit, were “extremely hazardous substances” for the purposes of EPCRA or that CERCLA as amended by the FARM Act did not require notification of such releases, the court focused on whether air emissions of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide from animal waste are releases that occur in a manner which would require notification under CERCLA section 103(a).
Section 103(a) of CERCLA provides that “any person in charge of […] an onshore facility” shall provide notification as soon as they have “knowledge of any release […] of a hazardous substance[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). CERCLA then defines “release” to include “any […] emitting […] into the environment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). The plaintiffs argue that because air emissions from animal waste emit ammonia and hydrogen sulfide into the environment, such releases occur in a manner that would require notification under CERCLA section 103(a) and therefore are subject to EPCRA notification requirements. However, the court disagreed.
According to the court, Congress has the authority to limit the manners of release that require CERCLA notification. In passing the FARM Act, the court notes that Congress did just that by amending CERCLA to exempt “air emissions from animal waste” from section 103(a) reporting requirements. The court concluded that the FARM Act “expressly incorporates a manner of release – emitting” from CERCLA notification requirements.
Because “air emissions from animal waste” are not releases that require notification under CERCLA section 103(a), the court concluded that EPA’s 2019 final rule exempting such releases from EPCRA notification requirements complied with the law. Accordingly, the court upheld the rule.
Conclusion
Following the court’s ruling, operators of CAFOs and other livestock facilities will continue to be exempt from both CERCLA and EPCRA notification requirements for air emissions from animal waste. The ruling was issued on August 7, and the plaintiffs have 60 days to file an appeal. While it is possible that an appellate court could overturn or modify the lower court’s decision, it is currently unclear whether plaintiffs will appeal the ruling. For now, and into the foreseeable future, the reporting exemption will continue to stand.
To view the court’s decision in Rural Empowerment Ass’n for Cmty. Help v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, click here.
To view the plaintiff’s complaint, click here.
To view section 103 of CERCLA, click here.
To view section 304 of EPCRA, click here.