JUDICIAL:

GREENGATE FRESH, LLLP, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY FRESH PROCUREMENT, LLC, et al. Defendants. SUNTERRA PRODUCE TRADERS, INC., et al. Intervening Plaintiffs,, No. 218CV03161JAMEFB, 2019 WL 2337150 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2019)
Before this Court is the Stipulation to Extend Claims Procedure Deadlines Set Forth in the Amended Preliminary Injunction Order, Establishing PACA Claims Procedure, and Allowing Expedited Discovery agreed to by and between Plaintiff GreenGate Fresh, LLLP, Intervening Plaintiffs Sunterra Produce Traders, Inc., 1st Quality Produce, Inc., Peterson Farms, Inc., Coastal Pacific Sales, LLC; Froerer Farms, Inc. d/b/a Owyhee Produce (the “Sunterra Group”), Nor-Cal Produce, Inc., and Ben E. Keith Company (collectively “Intervening Plaintiffs”), Consolidated Plaintiffs FreshPoint Denver, Inc. and Ruby Robinson Co., LLC (the “FreshPoint Group” with GreenGate and Sunterra Group, and Intervening Plaintiffs are together “Plaintiffs”), and Intervenor Produce Pay, Inc. (“Produce Pay”) (Plaintiffs and Produce Pay are the “Parties”), by and through their respective undersigned attorneys.
Klun v. Klun, 2019 CO 46
Defendant Michael Klun appeals the water court’s order denying his motion for attorney fees after he prevailed on all claims brought against him in the underlying action by plaintiffs Thomas Klun and Joseph Klun, Jr.

Defendant here asserts that he is entitled to recover his attorney fees pursuant to a fee-shifting provision of a prior settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) between him and plaintiffs.

Because (1) section 13(a) of the Settlement Agreement provided that the prevailing party in an action to enforce, by any means, any of the terms of that Agreement shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees; (2) plaintiffs’ claims, in substance, sought to enforce the Agreement; (3) plaintiffs’ own pleadings in this case evinced their understanding of this fact; and (4) defendant prevailed on all claims below, we conclude that defendant is entitled to recover his attorney fees in this case.
Accordingly, the court reverses the water court’s order denying an award of such fees, and we remand this case to that court with instructions that the court determine and award the reasonable attorney fees that defendant incurred at trial and in these appellate proceedings.
JOSELIN BARRERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant. Additional Party Names: Elias de la Garza, Judi Fitzgerald, No. N15C-10-118 VLM, 2019 WL 2331090 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2019)
Plaintiffs Joselin Barrera, Judi Fitzgerald, and Elias de la Garza (“Plaintiffs”) filed claims alleging their cancer was caused by exposure to Defendant Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”)’s glyphosate-based herbicide product, more commonly known as Roundup. Monsanto moves under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 to have Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions excluded for failure to satisfy Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 and for summary judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 56. Plaintiffs, conversely, move to strike certain opinions of Monsanto’s expert witnesses under Daubert. After considering the parties’ written submissions, supplemental submissions, and oral arguments, for the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Daubert Motion is granted in part, and denied, in part, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Strike Certain Opinions of Defendant’s Expert Witnesses is denied.
Puntenney v. Iowa Utilities Bd., No. 17-0423, 2019 WL 2306289 (Iowa May 31, 2019)
The Bakken Oil Field has made North Dakota the second leading oil-producing state in our country. Almost all of America’s oil-refining capacity, however, is located elsewhere in the nation. For this reason, an underground crude oil pipeline was proposed that would run from western North Dakota across South Dakota and Iowa to an oil transportation hub in southern Illinois. Following a lengthy administrative proceeding, the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) approved the construction of this pipeline in Iowa and approved the use of eminent domain where necessary to condemn easements along the pipeline route.
Several landowners and an environmental organization sought judicial review. They contended the pipeline did not serve the “public convenience and necessity” as required by law, see Iowa Code § 479B.9 (2016); did not meet the statutory standard required for a taking of agricultural land, see id. §§ 6A.21(1)(c), .22(1); and did not meet the constitutional definition of “public use” set forth in article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Two of the landowners also raised claims personal to them. The district court denied the petitions for judicial review, and the petitioners have appealed.
On appeal, the court concluded that the IUB’s weighing of benefits and costs supports its determination that the pipeline serves the public convenience and necessity. They also concluded that the pipeline is both a company “under the jurisdiction of the [IUB]” and a “common carrier,” and therefore is not barred by Iowa Code sections 6A.21 and 6A.22 from utilizing eminent domainSee id. §§ 6A.21(2), .22(2)(a)(2). In addition, they concluded that the use of eminent domain for a traditional public use such as an oil pipeline does not violate the Iowa Constitution or the United States Constitution simply because the pipeline passes through the state without taking on or letting off oil. Lastly, they determined that the IUB’s resolution of the two individual landowner claims was supported by the law and substantial evidence.
HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, et al. Defendants., No. 1:18-CV-00646 (TNM), 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019)

The Humane Society submitted two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, seeking site-inspection reports and other inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitors. The Service released responsive records but redacted significant portions citing privacy concerns. The Humane Society alleges that those redactions are improper, and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court will grant in part and deny in part both motions for summary judgment.

Garybo v. Bros, No. 115CV01487DADJLT, 2019 WL 2325564 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2019)

This matter is before the court on the motion for class certification filed on behalf of plaintiffs Sandra Garybo and Agustin Vega (“plaintiffs”).  Plaintiffs also seek to be appointed as class representatives and to appoint the attorneys of the firms Mallison & Martinez and Martinez, Aguilasocho & Lynch, APLC as co-class counsel. (Id.) Defendant Leonardo Bros. did not file an opposition to plaintiffs’ motion and, accordingly, plaintiffs filed a statement of non-opposition on October 3, 2018, requesting that the court grant their motion without a hearing.
Nonetheless, the court held a hearing on the motion on October 16, 2018. At the hearing, attorneys Stanley Mallison and Hector Martinez appeared on behalf of plaintiffs and the prospective class. No appearance was made on behalf of defendant Leonardo Bros. Having considered the parties’ briefing, and having heard from counsel, the court will grant plaintiffs motion for class certification, appoint plaintiffs as class representatives, and appoint plaintiffs’ counsel as co-class counsel.
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