Though 2026 is young, the year has already seen a few interesting judicial rulings related to food law coming out of the state of Texas. Specifically, courts in the Western District of Texas have issued two decisions on preliminary injunctions – granting one and denying the other. This article is the second in a two-part series covering recent litigation updates in Texas. The first article can be read here.
Cell-cultured Protein Ban
The first case involves a challenge to a Texas law that sought to temporarily ban the sale of “cell-cultured proteins” in Texas. SB 261, passed in the 2025 Texas legislative session, defined cell-cultured protein as “a food product derived from harvesting animal cells and artificially replicating those cells in a growth medium to produce tissue.” Per the law, the prohibition on selling cell-cultured meat went into effect on September 1, 2025, and will last until September 1, 2027. The law is codified into the Texas code at Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 431.002(5-a), 431.02105(a). Texas is one of seven states to have passed a ban on the sale of cell-cultured meat. To learn more about other state alternative protein laws, click here to view NALC’s Alternative Protein Laws State Compilation.
The day after SB 261 went into effect, it was challenged in court. The plaintiffs are Wild Type, Inc. d/b/a Wildtype (Wildtype) and UPSIDE Foods, Inc. (Upside) – two companies based out of California who produce and sell cultivated meat. Wildtype produces cultivated salmon, and Upside produces cultivated chicken. The plaintiffs claim that SB 261 violates the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution.
January 2026 Ruling
On January 16, 2026, the court heard oral arguments on a number of motions in this case. Following the arguments, the court orally ruled on all motions; however, it also released an order explaining the decisions. The motions that were heard included Defendant Garza’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; Defendants Paxton, Young, and Shuford’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim; and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Specifically, the judge granted Defendant Garza’s Motion to Dismiss and Granted in-part the Motion to Dismiss from Defendants Paxton, Young, and Shuford. This means that Defendant Garza, the County Attorney for Travis County, will no longer be a party in this case. As for the other defendants, the court granted in-part their motion to dismiss. This means that while it dismissed part of the claims against them, the case will still be allowed to continue on some of the Plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the court dismissed Upside’s claims that SB 261 is preempted by the federal poultry laws, but found that both plaintiffs may still bring their claim that SB 261 violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
In determining these rulings, the court specifically looked to Upside’s claim that the Poultry Product Inspection Act (PPIA) preempted SB 261. The PPIA is the federal law that “regulates the processing, inspection, distribution, labeling, and sale of poultry products sold in interstate commerce,” and it is administered by the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Specifically, the PPIA includes an express preemption clause that states “requirements within the scope of this chapter with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment which are in addition to, or different than those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State.”
Express preemption claims will be evaluated by looking to the scope of the express preemption clause and determining if the challenged state law falls within the scope. Here, the court determined that the scope of the PPIA’s express preemption claim extended to food safety activities and any behaviors that would cause the adulteration of a product. Under that standard, the court finds that SB 261 does not fall within the scope of the PPIA’s clause because SB 261 is a “complete sales ban” that has no impact on food safety nor behaviors that might adulterate a chicken product. Thus, the court found that the PPIA would not preempt SB 261 and that claim should be dismissed.
Last, the court turned to the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In making this motion, Upside and Wildtype were asking the court to prohibit Texas from enforcing this law while the litigation is ongoing. A preliminary injunction will have four elements: 1) moving party must show they are likely to succeed on the merits, 2) that they will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued, 3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and 4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Here, the court determined that the Plaintiffs do not meet the irreparable harm element because Plaintiff’s do not have significant “contractual business already in place in Texas.” Additionally, the court finds that it would not be in the balance of equities to grant this preliminary injunction for two companies with very little business in Texas. Further, since two of the four elements are not met, the court declines the opportunity to analyze all four and denies the preliminary injunction.
Effect of the ruling
The court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction does not mean the case is resolved, nor is it a determination on the case’s merits. This decision’s effect is that the state of Texas will have the ability to enforce the ban on cell-cultured proteins while the litigation remains ongoing. Further, because of the court’s decision to deny Defendants Paxton, Young, and Shuford’s motion to dismiss against the Dormant Commerce Clause claim, the case will continue on that claim. However, Upside and Wildtype have appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction to the 5th Circuit. While it remains unclear at this time how the 5th Circuit will rule, it is likely that no judgement on the merits will occur until the preliminary injunction issue is first settled.
MAHA Law
Also, in its 2025 legislative session, Texas passed SB 25, which has been referred to as Texas’ “MAHA bill.” This name is referencing the fact that many of the policy changes included in this legislation are aligned with priorities of the “Make America Healthy Again” movement. This law includes a section that requires food manufacturers to bear a particular disclosure statement if their food product contains any of 44 listed ingredients. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 431.0815. Specifically, the disclosure must say, “WARNING: This product contains an ingredient that is not recommended for human consumption by the appropriate authority in Australia, Canada, the European Union, or the United Kingdom.” This portion of SB 25 will not go into effect until January 1, 2027, and its scope is limited to food product labels developed or copyrighted after the effective date. To learn more about the legislation itself, click here to read NALC article “’MAHA’ Movement: New Texas and Louisiana Laws.”
On December 5, 2025, a group of nonprofit associations that represent food and beverage manufacturers brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of SB 25’s labeling provision. Specifically, the plaintiffs make four claims 1) that SB 25’s labeling requirement is a violation of the First Amendment, 2) that it is preempted by federal law, 3) that it is unconstitutionally vague, and 4) that it violates the Dorman Commerce Clause.
Like the litigation on Texas’ cell-cultured meat ban, this case remains ongoing. However, the court recently published an order that ruled on the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. As previously mentioned, a preliminary injunction is a pretrial motion that can order a party to cease or begin doing a specific action. For a preliminary injunction to be successful, the moving party must satisfy four elements: 1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits, 2) that they will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued, 3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and 4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To determine if the first element of a preliminary injunction is met, the court first looked to see if plaintiffs would be likely to succeed on their claim that SB 25’s labeling requirement violates the First Amendment. The First Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech and includes protections against content-based regulations. A content-based regulation is one that will compel a particular message and require an individual or entity to alter the content of their speech. These laws are presumed to be unconstitutional unless the government can prove “they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests” under the standard of strict scrutiny.
Here, the court notes that SB 25 compels the manufacturers of foods and beverages to convey a word-for-word, government-scripted message on their food labels. As a result, the court finds that strict scrutiny is likely to be the standard applied. When strict scrutiny is applied, the burden shifts, and now the government must prove that its actions were constitutional (as opposed to the plaintiffs having to show that the actions were unconstitutional). The court noted that the government failed to meet its burden, instead focusing almost entirely on a different argument. Because the government did not meet its burden under that analysis, if the strict scrutiny standard is applied, the statute would be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.
Instead, the government primarily focused its argument on a claim that the court should consider the case under the intermediate scrutiny argument. Intermediate scrutiny would be applied here if a court classified SB 25’s labeling provision as commercial speech rather than content-based regulation. While the court does not assess whether it is commercial speech or content-based here, it walks SB 25 through an intermediate scrutiny analysis by applying the four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). It’s four elements include 1) is the speech misleading or does it concern unlawful activity, 2) is there a substantial government interest, 3) does the regulation advance the government interest asserted, and 4) is it narrowly tailored to achieve the interest.
Here, the court determines that there is a substantial government interest in promoting the consumption of better food ingredients by citizens of Texas. However, the court does not believe that SB 25’s labeling provision asserts this interest in a “narrowly tailored” way. It finds there are less restrictive ways Texas could accomplish this goal. As an example, the court states that Texas could have conducted a public advertising campaign warning of these dangers. Thus, the four elements of Central Hudson are not met, and the court determines SB 25’s labeling provision would likely not pass intermediate scrutiny. Since the court found that the provision would likely not pass either a strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny evaluation, it concludes that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim.
Before moving on to the other elements though, the court also evaluates the likelihood of success on plaintiff’s vagueness and preemption claims. Both of these claims are related to a portion of SB 25’s labeling provision that would make the provision ineffective if the US Food and Drug Administration or the USDA issued a law or regulation that prohibited the use, imposed conditions of use, or determined the safety of one of the 44 listed ingredients. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 431.0817. The court determines that plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed on their vagueness challenge because they have not produced enough evidence to show that food or beverage manufacturers would be unclear on what triggers the preemption clause. Further, the court finds that the plaintiffs would likely not succeed on their claim that SB 25’s labeling provision is preempted by current federal laws because neither the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act nor the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act “directly conflict” with the Texas law. Though the court finds that success on the merits is not likely with the claims of vagueness and preemption, the first element of a preliminary injunction is met through the likelihood of success on the First Amendment claim.
Irreparable Harm
Next, the court looked to the second factor of a preliminary injunction, irreparable harm. To meet this element, the person seeking a preliminary injunction must prove they are likely to suffer irreparable harm if the law is enforced. In cases involving the First Amendment, courts recognize that the loss of free speech constitutes an irreparable injury, even if the injury only occurs for a short period of time. Here, since the court found it was likely that plaintiffs would succeed on their First Amendment claim, the court determines that irreparable harm is satisfied. Thus, the second element of a preliminary injunction is met.
Balance of Equities and Public Interest
Last, the court looked to the third and fourth elements of a preliminary injunction. In cases where the government is the defendant, these two factors merge. This element will consider whether the hardships imposed on the moving party outweigh the public’s interest the law’s enforcement. Here, since the hardship suffered is a likely infringement upon First Amendment freedoms, the court determines that this outweighs any public interest in SB 25’s enforcement. Accordingly, the court finds that the third and fourth factors of a preliminary injunction are met.
Effects of the ruling
Since the four factors were satisfied, the court grants the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction and the state of Texas will be prohibited from enforcing the labeling provisions of SB 25 while the litigation is ongoing. A decision on a preliminary injunction is not a ruling on the merits, but might be an indicator of the direction a court might go in the future. A trial date has not yet been set for this case, and it currently sits in the discovery phase of the lawsuit.
Conclusion
Since neither of the court’s most recent rulings on SB 261 or SB 25 were final judgements, there will likely continue to be noteworthy updates in both cases. To stay up-to-date on these lawsuits and other issues related to food law, click here to subscribe to NALC’s biweekly newsletter, “The Feed.”