Jakob Christopherson, Research Fellow
“We shall escape the absurdity of growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing by growing these parts separately under a suitable medium,” declared Winston Churchill in his 1931 essay, “Fifty Years Hence.” Fast-forward to 2025, and this once outlandish idea is now possible with technological advancements such as cell-cultured meat: food products created by growing livestock cells outside of an animal. Cell-cultured meat is not the only emerging protein advancement; plant-based meat is another. However, various states have been hesitant to welcome either and have introduced cell-culture meat bans or plant-based label restriction laws.
Background
As of September 2025, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, and Texas have passed bans on the manufacturing, sale, or distribution of cell-cultured meat. To learn more about these type of state laws, click here to read NALC’s article “Cell-Cultured Meat Updates: state bans, labeling requirements, and regulatory clarifications. Instead of a sweeping ban, other states have taken a more limited approach to cell-cultured meat regulations. For instance, Iowa passed a law that prohibits school districts, community colleges, and public universities from purchasing lab-grown meat. Iowa Code §§ 260C.10-10A; 262.25d-253; 283a.12-13. Similarly, in 2025, South Dakota prohibited “awarding or use of state funds for the research, production, promotion, sale, or distribution of cell-cultured protein.” S.D. Codified Laws § 39-5-55. However, this bill does not apply to the Board of Regents or any institution it controls. In totality, not all cell-cultured meat regulations have been strictly prohibitive, twenty-two state legislatures have passed food labeling requirements. To learn more about the state legislation that has been enacted related to alternative proteins, click here to view NALC’s Alternative Protein Laws state compilation.
As expected, interested stakeholders have pushed back against these state statutes and challenged their legality in court. Opponents of the statutes banning cultivated meat sales have raised questions about federal preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause. However, opponents of the labeling statutes raised questions of First Amendment rights and have gotten mixed results from the courts. For example, Arkansas has seen parts of its labeling statute held as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. On the other hand, the labeling statutes for Louisiana and Oklahoma were held to be constitutional. This article will specifically discuss four cases related to cell-cultured meat and alternative proteins. To learn more about earlier alternative protein labeling law challenges, click here to read NALC article series, “Truth in Labeling Laws(uits).”
Cell-Cultured Meat Ban Litigation
Florida
On August 8th, Upside Foods filed a complaint to challenge the constitutionality of Florida’s ban on the manufacturing, distribution, and sale of cultivated meat, Fl. St. § 500.452. In 2016, Upside Foods was incorporated to sell cell-cultured meat. Then in 2022, the FDA and USDA green-lit Upside Foods to sell its cell-cultured meat, making it the first company in the US to receive authorization to do so. However, after the Florida ban took effect on May 1, 2024, Upside was prohibited from selling cell-cultured meat within Florida, despite its federal approval. Punishments for violating the ban include a second-degree misdemeanor, up to a 60-day’ imprisonment, and up to a $500 fine. Furthermore, a food establishment found violating the statute can have its operating permit revoked or suspended and face up to a $5000 fine per violation. Upside Foods alleges the ban’s enactment results in three different constitutional violations.
First, Upside Foods argues that under the Supremacy Clause, the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) expressly preempts it. Express preemption is a constitutional legal doctrine that provides that when Congress explicitly claims exclusive regulatory authority over an area, states cannot regulate in this area. Here, Upside Foods argues that Congress claimed exclusive regulatory authority over poultry ingredient requirements, as 21 U.S.C. § 467e prohibits states from creating different ingredient requirements from the PPIA. Consequently, Upside Foods claims the ban creates a different ingredient requirement than the PPIA by prohibiting cell-cultured meat in poultry products, while the PPIA has no such prohibition. Thus, Upside argues Florida’s ban is a state regulation in an area of authority that exclusively belongs to Congress and is therefore unconstitutional.
Second, Upside Foods claims that under the Supremacy Clause, the PPIA field preempts the ban. Field preemption is a form of implied preemption that occurs when federal laws are so comprehensive that no room remains for state regulation or clear congressional intent for exclusivity. Here, Upside Foods argues Congress has already enacted a comprehensive regulatory framework for the production and distribution of poultry. Thus, Upside Foods argues that “by preventing UPSIDE from manufacturing, distributing, and selling cultivated chicken that is produced in accordance with federal requirements for poultry facilities, Florida is ‘substitut[ing] a new regulatory scheme for the one the FSIS uses.’” To learn more about federal preemption, click here to view the NALC article “Procedures: Federal Preemption.”
Third, Upside Foods asserts the ban violates the Dormant Commerce Clause as it was “enacted with a discriminatory purpose and operates with discriminatory effect to benefit in-state agricultural interests at the expense of out-of-state competition.” The Dormant Commerce Clause prevents “states from enacting laws that discriminate against, or unduly burden, interstate commerce.” Thus, Upside Foods argues that by banning the manufacturing, sale, and distribution of cell-cultured meat, Florida is discriminating against interstate commerce and offering a benefit to its agriculture . As a result of these alleged constitutional violations, Upside Food’s complaint requests that the ban be struck down and for preliminary and permanent injunctions be granted against the enforcement of these regulations, laws, rules, and policies. Injunctions are court orders that require a person or party to either do or stop certain conduct. However, on October 11th, 2024, Upside Foods’s request for a preliminary injunction – a court order requiring the defendant to temporarily continue or cease certain conduct until the lawsuit is resolved – was struck down.
On May 4th, 2025, the District Court of the Northern District of Florida granted in part and denied in part the Florida’s motion to dismiss. Florida argued that Upside Food’s complaint should be dismissed as it “lacks a private cause of action to enforce the PPIA, fails to allege that Florida’s ban is preempted by the PPIA, and fails to allege that Florida’s ban violated the dormant Commerce Clause.” Ultimately, the court determined that Upside Foods lacks a to enforce the PPIA. Further, the court stated that even if Upside Foods had a private cause of action, the ban is not preempted by the PPIA. Therefore, the court dismissed Upside Food’s preemption claims. However, the court ruled that Upside Foods had “plausibly alleged that Florida’s ban violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates in effect against interstate commerce.” Therefore, Upside Food’s dormant Commerce Clause claim is not dismissed, and litigation over this claim is ongoing. Although the lawsuit had scheduled a bench trial for 2026, the court plans to change the trial date once it rules on any forthcoming motions for summary judgment.
Texas
On September 2nd, Upside Foods filed a lawsuit in response to Texas’s recently enacted SB 261, which temporarily bans cell-cultured meat from being sold within Texas until September 1, 2027. This lawsuit was filed with Wildtype, a company that produces cell-cultured salmon, as a co-plaintiff and Attorney General Paxton, Executive Commissioner Young, and Commissioner Shuford as the defendants. This lawsuit challenges the ban’s constitutionality on two grounds: the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause federal preemption. For both claims, the plaintiffs use the same logic and arguments they provided in the lawsuit against the Florida ban. The defendants have yet to file an answer to the complaint but have a deadline from the court to answer by October 26, 2025. However, the defendants did file a motion to dismiss that the court is currently considering.
In both the challenge of Florida’s law and the challenge of Texas’ Law, the plaintiffs are represented by attorneys at the Institute for Justice (IJ). IJ is a nonprofit, public interest law firm who states its mission is “to end widespread abuses of government power and secure the constitutional rights that allow all Americans to pursue their dreams.”
Alternative Protein Labelling Litigation
Oklahoma
State cell-cultured meat bans are not the only topic of litigation in the alternative protein arena – challenges to state alternative protein label laws have also commenced. Plant Based Foods Association (PBFA) and Tofurky challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s Meat Consumer Protection Act’s (“MCPA”). Plant Based Foods Association et al v. Stitt et al. The MCPA prohibits “misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock” or failing to display that a product is plant-source derived. Okla. Stat. tit. 2, 5-107.
On June 24th, 2024, the U.S. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma entered an order in the lawsuit. This order lays out the court’s decisions on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment: a motion asking the judge to render a verdict for either party to avoid going to trial. PBFA and Tofurky assert five claims: preemption under federal law (Count One), violation of the Supremacy Clause (Count Two), discrimination in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause (Count Three), excessive burden in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause (Count Four), and violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Five).
Defendants, Governor Stitt and Commissioner Arthur, motioned for summary judgment challenging both PBFA and Tofurky’s standing and claim merits. PBFA and Tofurky responded by moving for summary judgment in their favor. Ultimately, the court decided to dismiss the entire lawsuit claiming that PBFA and Tofurky lack standing to bring this case. Standing requires meeting a three-element test: injury, causation, and redressability. Injury must be an invasion of a legally protected right, and it must be concrete, particularized, imminent or actual, not hypothetical or a mere interest. Causation requires a causal connection between an injury and disputed conduct that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, not a third party. Redressability requires that a favorable decision is likely to resolve the injury, and the standing sought is aligned with the relief sought. To learn more about standing, click here to read NALC article “Procedures: Standing.”
Here, the court holds that neither Tofurky nor PBFA meets the requirements for individual standing, as both fail to show an injury in fact. First, Tofurky suffers no injury as the MCPA applies only to sellers who sell both “real meat and plant-based meat products.” As a result, Tofurky, a 100% plant-based meat product seller, is not subject to the MCPA. Second, PBFA’s alleged injury of using resources to “combat harm” caused by the MCPA is an unacceptable injury. The court reasoned that if the injury requirement could be fulfilled by simply spending money, any organization could challenge any statute by spending “a single dollar,” effectively rendering the injury requirement pointless. Moreover, PBFA alleges an injury from the MPCA as “it frustrates PBFA’s ability to accomplish its mission.” However, the court holds that this argument lacks merit as the MCPA does not affect PBFA’s core business . Therefore, neither Tofukey nor PBFA was deemed to have individual standing.
Additionally, an organization can bring suit on behalf of its member(s) if three elements are met. First, at least one member suffered an injury in fact. Second, the interests the organization seeks to protect must be relevant to its purposes. Third, the claims asserted and the relief requested must not require the participation of individual members. As discussed above, Tofurky is unable to show injury by the MCPA. Thus, the court held PBFA failed to meet the first element. Consequently, PBFA cannot challenge the MCPA using organizational standing. As a result, the court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, meaning PBFA and Tofurky may refile the lawsuit if they feel they can meet the standing requirements at a later time.
This year, Oklahoma enacted a new law related to the labeling of alternative proteins. The law, codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-1150, prohibits “manufactured-protein food products” from being “falsely advertised.” Oklahoma’s new law makes no mention of the former MCPA; thus, it can be inferred that the MCPA is still in effect. The law does not go into effect until November 1, 2025, and so far, no lawsuit has been filed to challenge it. To learn more about other updates to state alternative protein laws, visit NALC’s website for Alternative Proteins: 2025 Legislation Update which will be published on Oct. 2.
Texas
Meanwhile, in Texas, Tofurky and PBFA brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the amendments to the Texas Health and Safety Code Sections 431.0805, 431.082, and 433.0415. These amendments created labeling requirements for “analogue products,” meaning “a food product derived by combining processed plant products, insects, or fungus with food additives to approximate the texture, flavor, appearance, or other aesthetic qualities or the chemical characteristics of any specific type of egg, egg product, fish, meat, meat food product, poultry, or poultry product.” 431.0805. Further, these amendments require labeling “an analogue product of meat, a meat food product, poultry, a poultry product, an egg product, or fish with one of the qualifying terms.” 431.082. For example, Tofurky’s plant-based chorizo sausage’s packaging would require a term like “plant-based.”
On October 14th, 2024, the U.S. The District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, entered an order in the lawsuit. This order lays out the court’s decisions on Defendants Governor Abbott, Attorney General Paxton, Executive Commissioner Young, and Commissioner Shuford’s motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs Tofurky and PBFA’s reply. Ultimately, the court holds that sovereign immunity – a legal principle requiring government consent to be sued in certain circumstances – applies to Governor Abbott, but not to Attorney General Paxton, Executive Commissioner Young, and Commissioner Shuford. As a result, the court dismisses Governor Abbott from the lawsuit.
Additionally, the court determined that Tofurky has the standing to challenge labeling requirements on plant-based products but not for cell-cultured meat products. This stems from the fact that Tofurky sells only plant-based meat products and no cell-cultured meat products. Similarly, PBFA has standing to challenge labeling requirements on plant-based products but not cell-cultured meat products. The court based this on two factors: PBFA is a “nonprofit trade association that represents the leading manufacturers and sellers of 100% plant-based foods, including plant-based meat producers.” Further, PBFA was unable to show evidence of a dues-paying member who sells both plant-based meat and cultivated meat products. This holding limits the scope of the lawsuit; PBFA and Tofurky will only be able to challenge the plant-based meat labeling amendments, not the cell-cultured meat labeling amendment.
Under this standing, Tofurky and PBFA can advance six claims: (1) preemption under federal law; (2) violation of the Supremacy Clause; (3) discrimination in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause; (4) excessive burden in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause; (5) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; and (6) violation of the First Amendment. The court also consolidated the federal preemption and Supremacy Clause claims, denying the motion to dismiss. It also denied motions to dismiss the discrimination and excessive burden claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause, as well as the Due Process and First Amendment claims. The litigation is ongoing and will continue under the five aforementioned claims against Attorney General Paxton, Executive Commissioner Young, and Commissioner Shuford. However, on September 2nd, 2025, Tofurky and PFBA received a settlement offer from the plaintiffs to resolve the case, but have not responded to the offer yet.
Labeling Lawsuits: Why Texas and Oklahoma Had Different Outcomes
The major similarity between the highlighted litigation is that all four allege roughly the same constitutional violations of the Supremacy Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the First Amendment. However, despite both the Texas and Oklahoma litigation being brought by the same plaintiffs, the two have diverged. The Oklahoma lawsuit was dismissed in full, while the Texas lawsuit was limited in scope to purely plant-based meat labeling constitutionality. This split can be attributed to the language of the two statutes. The Oklahoma statute was held to apply to only sellers, like Tyson Foods, who sell both “real meat and plant-based meat products.” The Texas statute applies to products, regardless of the seller’s overall business model. As a result, despite both lawsuits being brought by the same two plaintiffs against the same type of labeling statute, Oklahoma was dismissed, and Texas was allowed to continue.
Additionally, the difference in outcome highlights the approach other states may take in drafting similar labeling requirements. Effectively, the manner the court interpreted the statute would allow Tofurky and other 100% plant-based sellers to avoid the statute’s requirements. Thus, greatly limits the scope of labeling statutes worded as such. As a result, states aiming for cell-cultured meat labeling laws with a broad scope may adopt language closer to Texas than Oklahoma. While the broader scope does inevitably open the gates for more litigation, most litigation has largely sided with the state’s side.
As for the Texas lawsuit, other challenged labeling statutes have been largely upheld. For example, the Fifth Circuit of Appeals held Louisiana’s cell-cultured meat labeling statute to be constitutional. A narrow interpretation of the statute does not violate any First Amendment protections on commercial speech. This suggests that PBFA and Tofurkey have an uphill battle. To learn more about commercial speech regulation, click here to read NALC’s “Truth in Labelling Law(suits) series.
Conclusion
Both the lawsuits challenging the bans will continue to progress. Given that the Florida and Texas lawsuits are the first litigation against a ban on cell-cultured meat, it is hard to predict where the lawsuits will go. However, as additional states have adopted cell-cultured meat bans during their 2025 legislative sessions so far, these lawsuits are unlikely to be the only lawsuits to strike down such a ban. Especially given Upside Food’s commitment to challenging these statutes. In conclusion, cell-cultured meat and alternative protein state legislation are largely quite new, and all litigation has largely been at the district level, thus the line between what is constitutional and what is not remains an open question. Until perhaps the United States Supreme Court elects to hear a case on it and bind all other courts.
To learn more about state laws related to Alternative Proteins, click here to view NALC Alternative Proteins state law compilation.
To stay up to date on this issue, click here to visit NALC partner PennState Law Center for Agricultural and Shale Law’s “Meat Labeling Law” Issue Tracker.
To learn more about the federal regulation of cell-cultivated meat, click here to view Congressional Research Service Report, “Cell-Cultivated Meat: An Overview”