


## About The Center

• Since 1987, the National Agricultural Law Center is the nation's leading source for agricultural and food law research and information.

- The Center is a unit of the University of Arkansas System Division of Agriculture
   In close partnership with the USDA Agricultural Research Service, National Agricultural Library
- Objective, non-partisan research and information regarding laws and regulations affecting agriculture

www.nationalaglawcenter.org





## Carbon Markets: Where are We?

- Still in the very early days.
   Contracts are <u>difficult</u> to obtain and typically contain confidentiality clauses.
- Likely to be variation in the amount of carbon that particular types of soil can capture
  - Sould mean substantial differences in the ability of farmers to capture payments in some parts of the country...
    Estimates for payments may not meet farmer's expectations if the company does not have good data in a particular area
- Perception: Substantial (voluntary) demand at present



Are there other potential tenants in the area that can (successfully) farm <u>and</u> abide by the carbon contract?

## What Practices are Covered?

• Different companies use (and value) different practices.

Common practices:

- Cover crops
   No-till or minimal till
   Buffer strips along streams (think EQIP)
   Crop rotational practices
- Rotational grazing practices
  Digesters at CAFOS
  Planting of trees/foregoing logging operations

- \*\*Cover crops and no-till seem to be popular practices



## **Calculating Payments**

- · Different companies may use different methodologies... \$15-\$20 per ton is what we are seeing presently, but some are as low as \$3 per acre
  Many contracts do not specify how the payment is calculated
- What about earlier adopters?
   Some contracts exclude acreages already using these practices
- Practical difficulties to consider: · What if not as much carbon is sequestered as expected? · What about a change of ownership?



### Additional Contract Issues


- "No Double Dipping" clauses...i.e. you can't sell the same benefits twice! Consider: federal or state cost share programs like EQIP
- Confidentiality clauses
- · Access to the property clauses
- Additional terms?
- · Some seem to reference a website with additional/changeable terms
- · Penalty clauses
- Definitions critical!
- Some contracts just cover carbon while others include "environmental benefits" such as water quality credits



# **Final Thoughts**

- Read all definitions carefully...
  Also consider what words/phrases are not defined
- · Lots of variability among contracts that we have heard about
- · Relatively young industry...many agreements are about "pilot programs"
- · Measuring and verification of carbon sequestered can be tricky
- Producers may be caught between the government and private sector
- Experience with wind leases may offer some lessons to consider Ex: statutory requirements to record contract with deed, for example





## **FIFRA** Preemption

- State authority under FIFRA:


  - (a) A state may regulate the sale or use of any federal registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
    (b) Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.
     7 U.S.C. § 136v.
- · Supreme Court in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences established preemption test:
  - "For a particular state rule to be pre-empted, it must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be a requirement 'for labeling or packaging'[.] Second, it must impose a labeling or packaging requirement that is 'in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
     This can include common law requirements that affect labeling or packaging of pesticides.
  - packaging of pesticides

### FIFRA Misbranding & Failure to Warn

• Misbranded:

- A pesticide is misbranded if [...] the labeling accompanying it does not contain directions for use which [...] are adequate to protect health and the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(F).
- Unlawful acts:
- It shall be unlawful for any person in any State to distribute or sell to any person [...] any pesticide which is adulterated or misbranded. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E).
- Failure to warn claims:
  - The defondant did not warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and best knowledge available at the time of manufacture or distribution.
     Anderson v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. 53 Cal.3d 987 (1991).
     Note: Elements of failure to warn can vary across states, but are largely similar









### Court Orders Chlorpyrifos Tolerances Revoked


- League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Regan, No. 19-71979 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2021)
- Plaintiffs filed a petition with EPA in 2007 seeking revocation of chlorpyrifos tolerances due to newly available scientific evidence
- Showing current chlorpyrifos tolerance levels caused neurodevelopmental effects in children
  EPA did not issue final decision on petition until 2017 when the Agency denied the petitioner's request
  This decision prompted lawsuit challenging the denial
- · Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, finding that that the FFDCA requires EPA to review a pesticide tolerance once the Agency comes aware of "genuine questions" of the tolerance's safety
- Emphasis on term safe in the FFDCA



## FIFRA & the FFDCA

- Section 408 of the FFDCA allows EPA to set tolerances for pesticide residues on food
  - "Tolerance" refers to the maximum level of pesticide residues legally allowed in or on raw agricultural commodities and processed foods

  - in or on raw agricultural commonities and processed roots
     In general, any pesticide residue in or on a food shall be deemed unsafe unless a tolerance for such pesticide chemical residue in or on such food is in effect[] 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(1)(A).
     EPA 'may establish or leave in effect a tolerance for a pesticide chemical residue in or on a food only if [EPA] determines that the tolerance is safe." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i).
- For a pesticide to be legally used in the U.S., it must be registered under FIFRA
  - \* To register a pesticide, EPA must conclude that it will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).
    \* "Unreasonable adverse effects" means "(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment [...] or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with" the FFDCA. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).



### **Paraquat Lawsuits**

- Emerging group of lawsuits with plaintiffs alleging paraquat exposure caused them to develop Parkinson's disease
- Plaintiffs bringing similar claims as plaintiffs in glyphosate suits
- Design defect, failure to warn, negligence, public nuisance, breach of implied warranty
- Earliest paraquat lawsuit filed in Illinois state court as *Hoffman v. Syngenta*, No. 17-L-517 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2021) Trail was scheduled to start June 1, 2021, but has been delayed
- Dozens of other paraquat cases filed in federal district courts have been consolidated into an MDL as *In re: Paraquat Products Liability Litigation*, No. 3:21-md-03004 (S.D. Ill. 2021)
- Jury trial date set for November 15, 2022




## Key Takeaways

- Preemption issue ramping up
- Decision from Supreme Court could impact future lawsuitsRevocation of pesticide
- tolerances opens new door to label cancellation
- Pesticide lawsuits continue gaining steam
  - Glyphosate suits continue
  - Paraquat lawsuits following similar patterns









### Federal-State Cooperative Cooperative Interstate Shipment Inspection Program AKA "Talmadge-Aiken" or "cross-utilization agreement" plants • Under federal inspection, but operating with state inspection personnel. "Same as" federal inspection reqs • State inspectors/state funds, 60% federal reimbursement Federal inspection requirements Inspectors employed by/paid by state, 100% federal reimbursement Additional cooperative agreement required Additional cooperative agreement required Interstate/international commerce Interstate/international commerce 24


- Eligibility: Small plants in MPI states that meet FSIS inspection standards











# Burden of Proof/Types of Violations

"Per se"

- Sufficient to show that action falls within a prohibited category (ex: horizontal agreements to fix prices; horizontal market allocation agreements; bid rigging among competitors)
   "Quick look"
- Quick look
   Appear on their face to be very clearly anticompetitive in nature and likely effect, but not part of
  prohibited category
   "Rule of Reason"
  - Consider whether a particular restraint of trade is unlawful as unreasonably interfering with competition, or is instead the result of a reasonable business justification
     Prove harm to the competitive balance of the industry as a whole



### SB: Meat Packing Special Investigator Act HR: Meat and Poultry Special Investigator Act

- Sponsors:
   •
   Scools Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT)
   •
   As of 11/12:: 6 cosponsors, referred to ag committee

   H.R. 28::0 Rep. Abigail Spanberger (D-VA)
   •
   As of 11/11/2:: 1 cosponsors, referred to subcommittee

- A of alp/1/21: 1000000000, referred to narcolumance to account of the second of the sec

- Pecific language: 756: 416, ORICO FTME SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR FOR COMPETITION MATTERS. 710 [STALMANDERGE OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR FOR COMPETITION MATTERS. 710 [STALMANDERGE OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR FOR COMPETITION MATTERS. 710 ] Structure in the second interview of the competition Matter (referred to in this section as the Office). 710 ] Structure interview of the competition Matter (referred to in this section as the Office). 710 ] Structure interview of the competition Matter (referred to in this section as the Office). 711 ] Structure interview of the competition Matter (referred to in this section as the Office). 712 ] Structure interview of the competition Matter (referred to in this section as the Office). 713 ] State and available tools, including subgeneras, to investigate and protecter deviations of this Act. 713 ] and available tools, including subgeneras, to investigate and protecter deviations of this Act. 713 ] and available tools, including subgeneras, to investigate and protecter deviations of this Act. 713 ] and available tools, including subgeneras, to investigate and sectory. 713 ] and a consultation with the grantment of Homeliad Security with respect to national sectory and critical infrastructure security in the 714 [] and and a structure of advance and one protections in the odian dispetition and sectory. 715 ] and a fattering and other proteinsions with sectory and critical infrastructure security in the 716 ] and and a structure of Homeliad Security with respect to national security and critical infrastructure security in the 716 ] and and a structure of Homeliad Security with respect to national security and critical infrastructure security in the 716 ] and and a structure of Homeliad Security with respect to national security and critical infrastructure security in the 716 ] and and a structure of Homeliad Security and the structure security in the secu



## Focus by Biden Administration

### • White House:

- Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (7/9/21)
   Create "White House Competition Council"
   Briefing paper: Addressing Concentration in the Meat-Processing Industry to Lower Food
   Prices for American Pamilies (9/8/21)
- DOJ:

- Active investigations into multiple companies/industries
   May 2021: Grand jury indictment of Claxton Poultry Parms for participating in a nationwide conspiracy to fix prices and rights for broiler chicken products.
   July 2021: Grand jury indictment of Koch Foods and four Pügrim's Pride executives in same conspiracy Currently congoing criminal Irial of four Pligrim's Pride executives charged with price fixing
- USDA:

  - JSDA:

     Frequently Asked Questions on the Enforcement of Undue and Unreasonable Preferences under the Packers and Stockwards Act (August 2021)

     Re-re-re issue GIPSA rules (early 2022)

     Strengthen USDA's enforcement of unfair and deceptive practices and undue preferences

     Poultry grower tournament system

     Basier for USDA to bring enforcement actions under the Act

     Change case law definition d'competitive injury'

     Individually harmed's harm to competitiveness of the industry as a whole




## Foreign Ownership of Ag Land

Foreign Ownership of Ag Land: Legal Background and Update (NALC webinar, available at <u>https://bit.ly/3nivh3y</u>)

- Key federal statute: Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA)
- · States' laws are definitely not a one-size-fits-all matter
- Renewed interest across the country, which is likely to increase over next year
- Recent federal proposals








### Where are we "Today"?

Latest official data via AFIDA is through December 31, 2019

- All 50 states and Puerto Rico report having some level foreign investment/ownership
   Concentrated in the Southern and Western United States
   Teras has Ingest amount of agrange (4 A million, Allowed by Maine (3,3 million acres) and Alabama (1.8 million acres)
   49% forest land, 25% cropland, 24% for pasture/other ag land
- · 40%+ of increase from 2018 to 2019 is attributed to Texas, Oklahoma, and Colorado
- Foreign individuals/entities reported holding an interest in about 35.2 million acress of U.S. agricultural land
   2,7% of all privately held agricultural land in the U.S.
   1,2% of all land in the U.S.
- Take special note of Maine accounts for about 10% of all reported U.S. ag land
   Followed by Hawaii (9.2%), Washington (6.9%), Alabama (6.1%), and Florida (5.8%)









# Snapshot of 2021: Country of Origin

- Canadian investors own largest amount of acreage (ag and non-ag)
   10,519,144 acres (primarily forest land)
   29%
- Netherlands (14%), Italy (7%), Germany (6%), and United Kingdom (6%)
   Combined, 11.7 million acres
   33%
- The remaining 13.6 million acres (38%) are spread across about 100 other countries
- Chinese investors own 191,652 acres, representing 0.05% of total foreign ownership
- · Note that "ownership" includes long-term leases

















## Snapshot of States' Laws

- There is no state with an absolute prohibition on foreign ownership
   This statement contradicts many publications/articles
- 13\* states have some level of foreign ownership restriction
   This statement contradicts many publications/articles
- 12 states have some type of reporting and/or registration requirement for ag land
   This does not account for laws requiring any corporation to obtain license or register
- 28\* states expressly allow for foreign ownership
   9 states are currently silent on the issue (reporting and prohibition/restriction)
- Several states have prohibitions specific only to public/state land • Not addressed in this presentation



### 13

| Foreign Ownership of Ag Land as of December 31, 2019  |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| <ul> <li>Iowa         <ul> <li>386,597</li> <li>1.2% (endy state that had decrease from 2018)</li> </ul> </li> <li>Kentucky         <ul> <li>33,61</li> <li>0.4%</li> <li>Minnecota</li> <li>520,741</li> <li>1.5%</li> </ul> </li> <li>Mississippi         <ul> <li>20,042</li> <li>2.7%</li> <li>Missicarii</li> <li>345,658</li> <li>1.0%</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <ul> <li>North Dakota         <ul> <li>302.715</li> <li>0.3%</li> </ul> </li> <li>Oklahoma         <ul> <li>1.145.277</li> <li>3.3%</li> </ul> </li> <li>Pennsylvania         <ul> <li>3.1.215</li> <li>1.5%</li> </ul> </li> <li>South Carolina         <ul> <li>4.81.475</li> <li>3.1%</li> </ul> </li> <li>South Dakota         <ul> <li>306.601</li> <li>0.5%</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |   |
| • Nobraska<br>• 517,613<br>• 1.1%   | • Wisconsin<br>• 476,241<br>• 1.8%   | Total Acres:<br>5,613,426;<br>16% of foreign<br>owned ag land |

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